The Impact of Securitization on Bank’s Credit Risk Taking Behavior by Xuyuan, Lezi & Zhou, You
THE IMPACT OF SECURITIZATION ON BANK’S CREDIT RISK 
TAKING BEHAVIOR 
by 
 
Lezi Xuyuan 
Bachelor of Science in Business Administration - Accounting, California State 
University, Long Beach, 2011 
 
You Zhou 
Bachelor of Business Administration, Simon Fraser University, 2011 
 
RESEARCH PROJECT SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT 
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF 
MASTER OF SCIENCE IN FINANCE 
 
BEEDIE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS 
 
© Lezi Xuyuan 2012 
© You Zhou 2012 
SIMON FRASER UNIVERSITY 
Summer 2012 
 
 
All rights reserved. However, in accordance with the Copyright Act of Canada, this work 
may be reproduced, without authorization, under the conditions for Fair Dealing. 
Therefore, limited reproduction of this work for the purposes of private study, research, 
criticism, review and news reporting is likely to be in accordance with the law, 
particularly if cited appropriately 
  
 2 / 48 
 
Approval 
 
 
 
Name:                Lezi Xuyuan and You Zhou 
 
Degree:                 Master of Science in Finance 
 
Title of Project:        The Impact of Securitization on Bank’s Credit  
     Risk Taking Behavior  
 
 
 
Supervisory Committee: 
 
      ____________________________________ 
      Dr. Jijun Niu 
      Senior Supervisor 
      Assistant Professor, Beedie School of Business 
 
 
      ____________________________________ 
      Dr. Christina Atanasova 
      Second Reader 
      Assistant Professor, Beedie School of Business 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Date Approved:        ____________________________________ 
 
 
  
 3 / 48 
 
Abstract 
 
This research studies the impact of securitization on the credit risk-taking behaviour of 
banks. Using a sample of the 100 largest U.S. banks over the period 2001 to 2010, we 
find that when use risk weighted asset to total asset ratio as a credit risk measurement, 
there is a positive relationship between securitization and bank’s credit risk taking 
behaviour. However, when use non-performing asset to total asset ratio as a credit risk 
measurement, we find a negative relationship between securitization and bank’s credit 
risk taking, and both findings are statistically significant for period 2001 to 2007. After 
we decompose the aggregate securitization, we find that various underlying assets have 
mixed effects of the overall impact of securitization on bank’s credit risk taking 
behaviour, with the Family Residential Loans tend to always contribute the most to the 
aggregate securitization’s impact. In sum, we conclude that the impact is ambiguous 
and the relationship will depend on the economic conditions. 
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Section 1. Introduction  
 
Being an efficient channel when banks want to seek external funding support, 
securitization had been gaining its high popularity in a very short period of time since 
invented. However, the recent financial crisis to some degree reflects the risky side of 
securitization and its related products, a famous example of that would be the failure of 
Lehman Brothers in 2008. After that banking institutions have started thinking about not 
only the benefits securitization may bring in, but also the possible problems it could lead 
to. Therefore, nowadays securitization related activities and their inherent benefits and 
risks have all become a controversy for financial institutions.  
 
Previous research studies of the impact of securitization on banks have agreed that a 
positive link between securitization and bank risk exists (for example, Dimnne and 
Harchaoui 2003; Uzun and Webb 2007). Because banks can use securitization to 
convert illiquid assets into liquid ones, their liquidity will increase and therefore they will 
seek for riskier assets to hold. Nonetheless there is very limited researches have been 
done in the area of how securitization is going to impact banks’ willingness to hold 
riskier assets in their portfolios.  
 
Cebenoyan & Strahan (2004) and Purnanandam (2009) once showed in their studies 
that, securitization as a tool to provide banks additional funding support and to increase 
their liquidity, it might therefore motivate banks to invest in assets with higher risks and 
returns. However, this opinion is challenged by some scholars (Calomiris and Mason 
2004; Vermilyea, Webb, and Kish 2008) because of the existence of loss sharing 
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agreements retained by the issuing banks. Those agreements are argued to actually 
increase issuing banks’ risks, just in off-balance sheet activities form. That is to say, 
securitization can expose the issuing bank to more credit risk. 
 
Given what being done by Casu et al. (2011), this study aims to contribute to the 
existing literature by extending the sample period three more years to cover the recent 
financial crisis period. Before the crisis, we follow our precedent paper’s hypothesis, 
which is greater outstanding securitization will bring greater credit risk exposure, 
therefore make banks more risk averse and tend to invest in lower credit risk assets 
(please refer to Table 1 for the expected signs of other control variables). During the 
crisis, we conjecture that the impact of securitization on banks risk taking behavior may 
be different due to the change of economy environment. Under normal economy 
condition investors in general do not think that much about assets’ risk before they 
invest, but this may not be the case when the crisis comes. During the hard time 
investors should be fully aware about the inherent risk any investment contains, 
therefore it becomes harder for banks to sell out their risky assets, namely banks can 
not reduce their risk through securitization easily any more. Following this argument, we 
predict that securitization’s impact on bank’s behavior should change along with the 
whole economy.  
 
After our empirical analysis, a positive relationship is indicated when using RWATA to 
measure credit risk, and the coefficient is statistically significant for period 2001 to 2007. 
This is inconsistent with what Casu et al. (2011) report in their study. But after we switch 
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to use NPATA to measure credit risk, a negative relationship is showed and is also 
significant for period 2001 to 2007. This is consistent with the result in Casu et al. 
(2011), which is also our hypothesis. Under both measurements, the significance of 
securitization’s coefficient changes for period 2001 to 2007 and period 2008 to 2010.   
 
The reminder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the recent 
relevant literature within this field of study; Section 3 introduces our regression models 
and each variable; Section 4 describes summary statistics of our sample data; Section 5 
reports our regression reports; our robustness tests are presented in Section 6; and 
finally Section 7 discusses the findings and concludes our paper.       
 
Section 2. Literature Review 
 
Often been criticized as the main driver of the 2007 financial crisis, securitization has 
caught increasing attention by researchers. The relationship between securitization and 
risk is one of the main focuses. Early researchers argue that securitization is a risk 
management tool (Greenbaum and Thakor 1987). Later studies analyze this issue in 
more detail.  
 
First of all, researchers ﬁnd that banks are more likely to securitize their riskier loans. 
Carey (1998) suggests that the default rates on the securitized loans are higher than the 
securitized loans. Dell’Ariccia, Igan, and Laeven (2009) and Keys et al. (2010) ﬁnd 
evidence that US banks securitized there worse mortgage loans in last decade. 
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Moreover, recent studies suggest that although banks transfer some of the default risk 
through securitization, banks are still exposed to credit risk raised from implicit and/or 
explicit arrangements (Gorton and Pennacchi 1995). Chen, Liu, and Ryan (2008) ﬁnd 
that banks level of credit risk exposes varies by type of securitization. 
 
Secondly, when taking into accounts the above arguments, researchers have mixed 
conclusions on the impact of securitization on banks overall risk. Some scholars ﬁnd a 
positive relationship between securitization and risk. Dionne and Harchaoui (2003) ﬁnd 
a positive relationship between securitization and bank’s credit risk taking. Jiangli and 
Pritsker (2008) suggest that mortgage securitization reduces bank insolvency risk. 
Others ﬁnd that securitization reduces a portion of bank risk. Cebenoyan and Strahan 
(2004) and Purnanandam (2009) suggest that securitization reduces bank risk, but 
banks use the proceeds from securitization to take new risks. 
 
In sum, previous studies have focused on the quality of the securitized assets and the 
impact of securitization on banks overall risk. This study attempts to attributes to the 
existing literatures by finding out banks credit risk taking behaviour as a result of 
securitization, and the robustness of the impact during the financial crisis period.  
  
Section 3. Empirical Model 
 
Casu et al. (2011) investigate whether outstanding securitization has an impact on the 
risk-taking behavior of the issuing bank during the period from 2001 to 2007. They find 
that banks with a greater amount of assets securitized are more risk-averse in their 
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activities. After breaking down the total securitization by each category, they also find 
that the negative relationship between securitization and risk taking is mainly driven by 
securitizations of mortgages, home equity lines of credit, and other consumer loans. 
Among these, securitized home equity lines of credit has the most negative relationship 
with banks’ credit risk taking behavior.  
 
Our empirical model is adapted from the one used by Casu et al. (2011). We extend the 
sample period (from 2001 to 2010), in order to consider the recent financial crisis. Our 
equation is:  
DCrR
i,t
= b
1
Sec
i ,t1
+b
2
Size
i,t1
+ b
3
Loan
i,t1
+b
4
Cap
i,t1
+b
5
ROA
i ,t1
+b
6
ChOff
i ,t1
+ 'Year+
i
+
i,t
 
where i denotes the bank. t denotes the year. We use annual data instead of quarterly 
data in this paper, since Berger and DeYoung (1997) once mentioned that the end-of-
year call report data are more accurate and smooth-out short-run aberrations in the data 
better than do quarterly data. Therefore we replace quarter dummies with year dummies 
in our equation. θ represents time-invariant, unobserved and unique bank 
characteristics, for example, CEO’s personality. We need to control for bank related 
factors like this since it may impact or bias the outcome. Lastly ε is the error term. 
 
For the dependent variables, to measure the changes of bank’s credit risk raking, we 
use Risk Weighted Assets/Total Assets (RWATA) and None Performing Assets/Total 
Assets (NPATA). Table 1 presents the definition of variables. Casu et al. (2011) include 
a detailed discussion of each variable (except NPATA) that we briefly summarize below.  
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RWATA is defined as a bank’s risk-weighted assets divided by its total assets. Casu et 
al. (2011) primarily use RWATA as the dependent variable. They mention in the study 
that Shrieves and Dahl (1992) suggest the RWATA ratio captures principal features of a 
bank’s portfolio risk, such as allocation of assets and the quality of its loans. 
 
NPATA is defined as Non-performing assets divided by total assets.  
Besides that, as Berger and DeYoung (1997) suggest, the NPATA ratio has the benefit 
of being less subject to managerial discretion. Also, several recent studies use this ratio 
to measure bank risk taking as well, such as Ghosh (2009), Jimenez et al. (2010), and 
Jones et al. (2011). These all indicate that NPATA is an efficient measurement for credit 
risk taking. 
 
Securitization (Sec) is introduced as a bank’s outstanding balance of securitized assets 
scaled by total assets. Casu et al. (2011) argue that holding securitized pool makes 
banks more risk-averse so they tend to shift portfolios toward lower credit risk assets. 
As a result, a negative relationship between outstanding securitization and credit risk 
taking should be found. Consistent with this argument, Casu et al. (2011) find there is a 
significantly negative sign between securitization and change of RWATA.  
 
Bank size (Size) is measured as the natural logarithm of total assets. This factor should 
be taken into account since Louskina (2005) mentions that largest banks have sufficient 
quantity and homogeneity of loans to better access the securitization market 
independently among other financial institutions. Given this better access to external 
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funding support and the credit risk transfer market for large banks, a positive relation 
between bank size and its engagement in high risk/return activities should be expected. 
Consistent with this argument, Casu et al. (2011) find that larger banks tend to pursue 
higher risk activities.  
 
From the balance sheet, Casu et al. (2011) include the loan ratio and the capital ratio 
into the model to control for their possible effect on bank risk taking. The loan ratio 
(Loan) is measured as loans over total assets; this can reflect the size of a bank’s loan 
portfolio. Casu et al. (2011) considers loans as relatively risker assets, therefore a bank 
with a larger loan portfolio should be more risk-averse. Not surprisingly, Casu et al. 
(2011) find a significantly negative sign for the parameter of Loan, reflecting an adverse 
impact the size of the loan portfolio has on bank risk taking.  
 
Bank capital (Cap) is measured as the ratio of equity capital to total assets. Casu et al. 
(2011) argue that there should be a negative coefficient on this variable since Anderson 
and Fraser (2000) show that for US banks, managerial shareholdings and risk taking 
became inversely related in the early 1990s due to additional regulations. In their 
empirical analysis Casu et al. (2011) find the expected negative effect equity capital has 
on bank risk taking, but it is not statistically significant.   
 
From the income statement, Casu et al. (2011) include ROA and the charge-off ratio 
(ChOff) to account for the possible impact of the present performance on a bank’s 
incentive to take on new risks. They argue that poor-performing banks (i.e. those with a 
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low ROA) might pursue risky and high return activities to re-establish profitability. That is 
why we expect a negative relation between bank profitability and risk. After analysis, 
Casu et al. (2011) find a negative but not significant link.  
 
The charge-off ratio reflects the asset quality of a loan portfolio. Casu et al. (2011) 
identify that low quality loans should discourage the bank manager from taking on more 
risk in the following period. Consistent with their thoughts, Casu et al. (2011) find a 
negative link between the charge-off ratio and risk taking.   
 
Section 4. Summary Statistics 
 
Our empirical analysis is based on panel data over the period 2001-2010. Compared to 
Casu et al. (2011) we extend the sample period by three more years to cover the recent 
financial crisis, so that we can explore if the impact of securitization as well as other 
variables on banks’ risk taking behavior is going to change before and during the crisis.  
 
We obtain our data from the Federal Reserve’s FR Y-9C database like what Casu et al. 
(2011) did in their paper. However, instead of focusing on 2000 plus banks we only 
examine the 100 largest banks in the US. As what mentioned in the last section, 
Loutskina (2005) notes that only the largest banks in the USA can have a sufficient 
quantity and homogeneity of loans to access the securitization market independently. 
Therefore a sample set consists of 100 largest banks in the US should be efficient 
enough for our study. As indicated in the above section, even though accounting data in 
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Federal Reserve’s FR Y-9C database are filed on a quarterly basis, we use annual data 
instead of quarterly data. Therefore after downloading we delete the first three quarters’ 
data and only the end-of-year data left. According to Casu et al. (2011), Schedule HCS 
of the Y-9C form reports the breakdown of securitization into seven categories: 1-4 
family residential loans; home equity lines; credit card receivables; auto loans; other 
consumer loans; commercial and industrial loans; and all other loans, all leases, and all 
other assets. We follow this definition here in our study.  
 
During the sample period, banks may experience merger and/or acquisition, or failure, 
therefore the total number of banks in our sample set decreases every year. Table 2 
shows the number of banks in each year over the sample period, starting from 100 in 
year 2001.  
 
Table 3 presents summary statistics of our sample. To emphasis the potential changes 
happened due to financial crisis, after reporting the overall summary statistics we 
separate the whole period into two sub-periods, before crisis (2001-2007) and during 
crisis (2008-2010). We report means and standard deviations for variables over two 
sub-periods, as well as the difference in means before and during the financial crisis 
with the statistical significance.   
 
For the whole period from 2001 to 2010, the dependent variable RWATA has a mean 
value of 0.720 with a standard deviation of 0.194. The other dependent variable NPATA 
has a mean value of 0.009 with a standard deviation of 0.009. When only considering 
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period 2001 to 2007, RWATA has a mean of 0.714, which is comparable with the mean 
value of 0.712 reported in Casu et al. (2011). Its standard deviation 0.205 is much 
higher than that of 0.118 reported in Casu et al. (2011), which makes sense since Casu 
et al. (2011) study 2190 banks, usually larger sample size will reduce sample deviations. 
Looking at independent variables, over the period 2001-2007, Loan has a mean of 
0.596, which is smaller than what being reported in Casu et al. (2011). And for the 
Capital we get a mean of 0.090 that is very close to 0.091, what reported in Casu et al. 
(2011). So on average top largest banks take fewer amounts of loans but hold similar 
amount of equity. Under the same period for ROA we get a mean of 0.013, which is 
higher than that in Casu et al. (2011), saying that largest banks on average have better 
performance during 2001-2007. For Charge-off ratio we have a mean of 0.006, this is 
much larger than what being reported in Casu et al. (2011). This shows that the quality 
for largest banks’ loan portfolio is worse than average banks. This is because large 
banks usually hold better reputation and stronger external funding support, which allow 
them to issue riskier and higher-return loans. This to some degree also explains the 
theory of “Too Big to Fail”.  
 
To examine the impact financial crisis may have on banks, now we look at the last three 
columns—Difference in means. Between two dependent variables, the mean for NPATA 
increases more than 61% during the crisis, and this difference is statistically significant. 
This indicates that, when using NPATA as a measurement of bank’s credit risk, we can 
conclude banks became riskier during the crisis. Several other changes in mean are 
also statistically significant. Securitization activities decreased more than 100% during 
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the crisis. When we decompose it into seven categories, we can see massive and very 
significant decreases in credit card receivables (CrCR), auto loans (AutoL) and other 
consumer loans (OtherC) contribute the most to the overall decrease in aggregate 
securitization. Looking at other control variables, Size increased during the crisis due to 
Merger & Acquisition activities. Capital ratio went up to ensure banks’ safety, as 
regulation required. Not surprisingly the performance measurement ROA decreased 
532% with a p-value of 0 during the crisis compared with before. Moreover, the 
statistically significant increase in mean of charge-off ratio tells us that the quality of 
banks’ loan portfolios decreased during the crisis. This further confirms that the crisis 
makes banks riskier.  
 
Table 4 presents the correlation matrix with all variables in panel A. Panel B shows 
correlations after we decompose securitization. The highest correlation in panel A 
(0.6864) occurs between NPATA and charge-off ratio, and it is statistically significant. 
Compared with the low correlation (0.0508) between RWATA and Charge-off ratio, we 
can infer that the NPATA is an efficient measurement for bank’s credit risk taking, since 
charge-off ratio to some extent reflects bank’s credit risk level from the perspective of 
the quality of loan portfolios banks are holding. One more correlation is noteworthy. The 
correlation between two dependent variables we are going to use in regression, 
RWATA and NPATA, is surprisingly very small (0.1161) and significant, which shows 
that the two measurements of credit risk we choose are not necessarily moving together.  
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Section 5. Empirical results 
 
Following Casu et al. (2011), we estimate our equation with fixed effects regression. 
Since observations on the same bank over time are likely to be correlated, each 
regression is performed with robust standard errors that are corrected for clustering at 
bank level. Firstly, we estimate for period 2001 to 2007 to compare our results with the 
results from Casu et al. (2011). Then, we perform regressions over the period of 2008 to 
2010 to take into account the influence of the financial crisis. Finally, we perform 
regressions over the period 2001 to 2010 to test the hypothesis for a longer period. We 
report our results in Table 5. Test results for period 2001 to 2010 are not reported in the 
table. Moreover, Year dummies are incorporated in all of the regressions, but are not 
reported in the table.  
 
Column (1) to (2) represents coefficients using RWATA as the risk measure. Column (1) 
represents period 2001 to 2007 and Column (2) represents period 2008 to 2010. The 
main focus of our research is on securitization. The coefficient on securitization is 
positive for all periods, suggesting that with the knowledge of increasing credit risk 
exposes arise from increasing volume of securitization pool, banks are more tolerance 
to credit risks. In other words, as securitization increases, banks tend to shift their 
portfolios toward assets with higher credit risk. This result is inconsistent with the 
previous study done by Casu et al. (2011). Moreover, although the coefficient on 
securitization is signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level for period 2001 to 2007, it is 
insignificant for period 2008 to 2010.  
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In Column (1), majority of the coefficients on other control variables are significant and 
are broadly consistent with what reported in Casu et al. (2011). In particular, the 
coefficient on size is positive and significant at 5% level, suggesting that larger banks 
are more capable and willing to take more risks than smaller banks do. The coefficient 
on loan is negative and significant, suggesting that as loan ratio decreases, banks are 
more risk tolerant. Hence, a larger amount of loans results in higher credit risk exposure 
and makes banks more risk-averse. The coefficient on equity-capital ratio is negative 
and significant, suggesting that when equity-capital ratio increases, banks are risk 
adverse and vice versa. Moreover, for period 2008 to 2010, the coefficients on other 
variables are consistent with our expectations, with only the coefficient of loan being 
statistically significant.  
 
Column (3) to (4) demonstrate estimates using NPATA as the dependent variable, with 
Column (3) represents period 2001 to 2007 and Column (4) represents period 2008 to 
2010. The coefficient on securitization is negative for all periods and statistically 
significant for period 2001 to 2007, suggesting that as securitization increases banks 
tend to shift their portfolios toward assets of lower credit risk. This result supports the 
proposed hypothesis that securitization is expected to have a negative effect on the 
risk-taking behaviour of the issuing bank as a result of credit exposure arising from the 
securitized pool. However, the result is inconsistent with our results using RWATA as 
the dependent variable. Furthermore, in Column (3), several coefficients on other 
variables are inconsistent with our expectations. In particular, the coefficient on loan is 
positive and significant, suggesting that as loan ratio increases, banks are more risk 
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tolerant and vice versa. Nevertheless, the results for period 2008 to 2010 are broadly 
consistent with those for period 2001 to 2007.  
 
In order to exam the impact of securitization in more details, we perform the same 
regressions over seven categories of underlying assets that compose securitization. 
The seven categories are: (i) family residential loans; (ii) home equity lines of credit; (iii) 
credit card receivables; (iv) auto loans; (v) other consumer loans; (vi) commercial and 
industrial loans; and (vii) all other loans and leases. Table 6 shows the regression 
results using RWATA as the dependent variable and Table 7 shows the regression 
results using NPATA as the dependent variable. We scale the underlying assets by total 
assets.  
 
Looking at Table 6, for period 2001 to 2007, the test results indicate that majority of the 
estimates is consistent with previous study but with some exceptions. For instance, the 
coefficients on family residential loans and other consumer loans are positive and 
significant at 5 percent level. Although half of the test results from period 2008 to 2010 
are inconsistent with those from period 2001 to 2007, those deviations are statistically 
insignificant. The exception is all other loans and leases. It has a negative effect on 
bank’s credit risk taking and is statically significant.  
 
Looking at Table 7 that shows that result for NPATA, for period 2001 to 2007, the test 
results are broadly consistent with those in Casu et al. (2011). Two major deviations are 
home equity lines of credit and commercial and industrial loans that have positive 
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relationships with bank’s credit risk taking and are statistically significant. Furthermore, 
for period 2008 to 2010, majority of the test results are consistent with the results for 
period 2001 to 2007. The exceptions are home line of credits and all other loans and 
leases, but they are statistically insignificant. 
 
 
Section 6. Robustness Test 
 
We test the robustness of our main regression results in several ways. First of all, 
following Casu et al. (2011), we use fixed effect regression to estimate. With the fixed 
effect model, we assume that the correlation between bank associated variable, i , and 
error term, , 1i t  , is not zero. Nevertheless, to verify that fixed effect model is appropriate 
and to ensure that our assumption is adequate, we re-estimate our regressions using 
random effect model. The results are presented in Table 8, Table 9, and Table 10. The 
RWATA results and the RRWATA results are largely consistent with each other. 
However, when compared the NPATA estimates and the RNPATA estimates, some 
results are consistent while others are not.  
 
Moreover, following Casu et al. (2011), we did not take into accounts of outlier effects at 
the variable level. We define outliers as any record that is over three standard 
deviations. However, by observing the data in details, we realized that majority of the 
variables have outliers. Hence, we re-estimate our models using winsorized data and 
the results are presented in Table 11, Table 12, and Table 13. After winsorizing, our 
estimates show that the impact of securitization on bank’s credit risk taking behaviour is 
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no longer statistically significant. Moreover, when we decompose the aggregate 
securitization and winsorize all the variables, the regression results are broadly 
inconsistent with the original results. Especially within 2008 to 2010 period, the 
deviation is substantial. This may be due to the relatively small sample size of each 
category, as well as the relatively large fluctuation in observations within each category.   
 
Section 7. Limitation of this study 
 
In this study we only examine banks’ credit risk taking behavior, our two dependent 
variables are designed to measure banks’ credit risk. However, it is well known that 
banks in reality expose to multiple types of risks, and our study does not take into 
account any other risk.  
 
In this study, we assume the lag securitization (along with other lag control variables) 
will cause the main change in banks’ credit risk. However we have to admit that the 
securitization and credit risk might be jointly determined. For example, on one hand 
securitization may affect a bank’s credit risk, on the other hand, banks with different 
levels of credit risk may have different incentives to engage in securitization. If that is 
the case, an alternative estimation method is needed to deal with endogeneity.  
 
As one result of our empirical study, the relationship between securitization and credit 
risk moves from statistically significant to insignificant when time period moves from 
2010-2007 to 2008-2010. Besides the conclusion we draw above, this fact may be 
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influenced by the relatively small sample size during 2008 to 2010. As shown in Table 2, 
the number of banks in our sample keeps shrinking over our 10-year horizon; in addition, 
the during crisis period (2008 to 2010) is shorter compared to pre-crisis period (2001 to 
2007), which may also reduce the power of the statistical tests for that period.  
 
In our study, we measure banks’ size using the natural log of total assets. An alternative 
measure for size is market capitalization. During the recent financial crisis, the market 
capitalization of many banks dropped dramatically. Therefore as a development of this 
study, one may use the market capitalization to measure the bank size, to see whether 
the results still hold.  
 
Section 8. Conclusion 
 
Casu et al. (2011) study the relationship between securitization and bank’s credit risk 
taking behavior; they use RWATA as the dependent variable and find a negative and 
statistically significant relationship, namely, banks with a greater amount of assets 
securitized are more risk-averse in their activities.  
 
Based on their study, we extend the sample period by three more years to include the 
financial crisis period. By examining the 100 largest banks in the US over the period 
2001 to 2010, we find that using RWATA as a credit risk measurement, there is a 
positive relationship between securitization and bank’s credit risk taking behaviour, and 
this relationship is statistically significant for period 2001 to 2007. This result is 
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inconsistent with result reported in Casu et al. (2011). However, when we use NPATA 
as the dependent variable, we find a negative relationship between securitization and 
bank’s credit risk taking, and this relationship is statistically significant for period 2001 to 
2007. After we decompose the aggregate securitization and do regression against each 
category, we find that various underlying assets have mixed effects of the overall impact 
of securitization on bank’s credit risk taking behaviour, with the Family Residential 
Loans tend to always contribute the most to the aggregate securitization’s impact.  
 
Two interesting conclusions can be drawn from our results. First, the opposite results 
from two dependent variables tell us that, RWATA and NPATA measure credit risk from 
different aspects. Moreover NPATA tends to be a more reasonable and efficient 
measurement for bank’s credit risk taking, as it reflects the fact that banks’ risk 
increased during the crisis in Table 3 (whereas according to RWATA there was no 
significant difference in risk before and during the crisis), moreover it has high and 
statistically significant correlation with charge-off ratio (we mentioned this point under 
Section 4). Second, no matter which dependent variable is used, no matter what the 
coefficient of securitization is, our results show that the impact of securitization indeed 
change before and during the crisis (both from statistically significant to insignificant), 
which is in line with our expectation. This demonstrates that securitization’s impact on 
bank’s credit risk taking depends on economy condition. Under normal condition 
securitization may increase banks’ credit risk exposure, therefore motivate banks to shift 
their portfolio to lower risk assets. Investors tend to think more and be reluctant to invest 
in high-risk financial products when economy is slow down compared with normal 
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situation. Therefore the influence securitization has on bank’s credit risk taking tends to 
disappear when the economy becomes abnormal and unstable.  
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Appendix 
 
Table 1:  
Variable Definition Construction Expected Sign 
RWATA risk-weighted assets Risk-weighted 
assets / total assets 
Dependent variable 
NPATA non-performing 
assets 
Non-performing 
assets / total assets 
Dependent variable 
Sec Securitization Outstanding 
securitized assets / 
total assets 
Negative 
Size Bank size log of total assets Positive 
Loan Loan ratio Loans / total assets Negative 
Cap Capital ratio Equity / total assets Negative 
ROA Return on assets Net income / total 
assets 
Negative 
ChOff Charge-off ratio Net charge-offs / 
loans 
Negative 
Note: This table presents deﬁnition, construction, and expected signs on the variables 
used in this study for the regression of bank credit risk taking. The data are collected 
from the Federal Reserve’sY-9C reports. 
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Table 2: Number of banks in our sample by year 
Year Number of banks 
2001 100 
2002 100 
2003 96 
2004 83 
2005 79 
2006 74 
2007 68 
2008 65 
2009 63 
2010 61 
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Table 3. Summary Statistics 
2002-2010 2001-2007 2008-2010 Difference in means 
 
N Mean Std.Dev N Mean Std.Dev N Mean Std.Dev (abs) (%) p-values 
RWAT
A 
617  0.7201093  0.1938313  439 0.7141687 0.2049068 178 0.7347607 0.1629451 -0.020592 -2.802545101 0.1889 
NPA 693  0.0089105  0.0097373  515 0.0063138 0.0055118 178 0.0164234 0.0143558 -0.0101096 -61.55607243 0 
            
Sec 691  0.1211043  0.4264164  513 0.1391097 0.4841666 178 0.0692123 0.1646098 0.0698974 100.989853 0.0048 
FamRL 693  0.0852345  0.3971548  515 0.0951546 0.4511412 178 0.0565334 0.1565808 0.0386212 68.31572133 0.0948 
HEL 691  0.0027061  0.0149603  513 0.003213 0.0170751 178 0.0012455 0.0051199 0.0019675 157.9686873 0.0203 
CrCR 691  0.0258205  0.1418524  513 0.0329909 0.1635574 178 0.0051551 0.1418524 0.0278358 539.966247 0.0002 
AutoL 691  0.0013171  0.0060575  513 0.0016857 0.0069507 178 0.0002548 0.0013288 0.0014309 561.577708 0 
OtherC 691  0.0027419  0.0170205  513 0.0033546 0.0194425 178 0.0009761 0.0056261 0.0023785 243.6738039 0.0131 
CommI
nL 
691  0.0018314  0.0082669  513 0.00219 0.0091769 178 0.0007981 0.0046221 0.0013918 174.3891743 0.0093 
OtherL 691  0.0041713  0.0159037  513 0.0041443 0.0148796 178 0.0042493 0.0185888 -0.000105 -2.470995223 0.9457 
             
Size 693  17.7281300  1.3925690  515 17.62253 1.353472 178 18.03364 1.461393 -0.4111119 -2.279694504 0.0011 
Loan 693  0.5943814  0.1763948  515 0.5961566 0.1741937 178 0.5892452 0.1830195 0.0069115 1.172941248 0.6605 
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Capital 693  0.0919323  0.0320099  515 0.0904422 0.0325733 178 0.0962436 0.0299934 -0.0058014 -6.027829383 0.0303 
ROA 693  0.0099171  0.0189258  515 0.0126531 0.0198761 178 0.0020012 0.0129749 0.0106518 532.2706376 0 
Choff 690  0.0080415  0.0100520  512 0.0062819 0.0080599 178 0.0131029 0.0130789 -0.006821 -52.05717818 0 
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Table 4 Correlation matrix  
Panel A 
 
RWATA NPATA securitization size loan capital roa choff 
         
RWATA 1
       
NPATA 
0.1161 
* 
1 
      
securitization 0.0016 0.2429* 1 
     
size -0.0207 0.1463* 0.1438* 1 
    
loan 0.5047* 0.2666* 0.0152 -0.2334* 1 
   
capital 0.2156* 0.1318* 0.1050* -0.0432 0.2429* 1 
  
roa 0.0934* -0.0167 0.1357 -0.1711* -0.0553 0.0487 1 
 
Choff 0.0513 0.6480 * 0.1318* 0.2182 0.1142* 0.2343* -0.2789* 1 
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Panel B 
 
 
RWAT
A 
NPATA 
securi
tizatio
n 
FamR
L 
HEL CrCR 
Auto
L 
OtherC
~L 
Com
mIn~L 
Othe
rL 
size loan 
capit
al 
roa 
cho
ff 
                
RW
ATA 
1 
              
NPA
TA 
0.1161 
* 
1 
             
secu
ritiza
tion 
0.0016 
0.2542
* 
1 
            
Fam
RL 
MBS 
-0.0346 
0.2556
* 
0.944
3* 
1                       
HEL -0.0758 0.0989 
0.556
4* 
0.555
6* 
1                     
CrC
R 
0.0980
* 
0.0355 
0.301
6 
-
0.021
1 
-0.027 1                   
Auto
L 
-0.0244 -0.0103 
0.006
* 
-
0.010
9 
-
0.0198
* 
0.012
7* 
1                 
Othe
rCon
L 
0.1355
* 
0.0267 
0.160
9* 
-
0.026
5 
0.1737
* 
0.457
4* 
-
0.02
77 
1               
Com
mInd
usL 
-
0.1479
* 
-0.0737 
0.071
8* 
0.016
3 
0.1407 
0.099
2* 
0.00
38 
0.0433
* 
1             
Othe
rL 
0.0418 0.0693 
0.037
6 
0.007
9 
0.0398 
-
0.020
6 
0.01
44 
-
0.0133
* 
0.000
9 
1           
size -0.0207 
0.1516
* 
0.126
1* 
0.105
* 
0.109* 
0.032
8* 
0.01
59 
0.0075 
0.144
6 
0.31
44 
1 
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loan 
0.5047
* 
0.246* 
-
0.008
9 
-
0.007
5 
-0.0941 
0.014
4* 
0.03
2 
0.0646 
-
0.257
4 
-
0.02
43 
-
0.34
56 
1 
   
capit
al 
0.2156
* 
0.1534
* 
0.071
3* 
-
0.018
3 
-0.1172 
0.298
5* 
-
0.02
87* 
0.1492
* 
-
0.183
3* 
0.01
04* 
-
0.11
65 
0.25
87* 
1 
  
roa 
0.0934
* 
-0.4382 
0.135
7 
0.052
7 
0.0323 
0.262
2 
0.02
9* 
0.1044
* 
-
0.006
9 
0.04
71 
-
0.06
14 
0.08
53 
0.08
96 
1 
 
choff 0.0513 0.6864 * 
0.114
* 
0.003
2 
-0.0785 
0.354
3* 
0.04
6* 
0.1117
* 
0.043
4* 
0.02
23* 
0.21
82 
0.04
68* 
0.14
99* 
-
0.36
4* 
1 
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Table 5 
 
 ∆RWATA ∆NPATA 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES 2001-2007 2008-2010 2001-2007 2008-2010 
SEC ,    0.00975** 0.145 -0.003*** -0.0159 
 (0.00377) (0.149) (0.001) (0.0152) 
Size ,    0.0413** 0.0729 0.002* -0.00256 
 (0.0196) (0.0440) (0.001) (0.00449) 
Loan ,    -0.238*** -1.095*** 0.006* -0.0230* 
 (0.0625) (0.263) (0.003) (0.0126) 
Cap
 ,   
 -0.722*** -0.0551 -0.016** -0.0334 
 (0.256) (0.811) (0.008) (0.0447) 
ROA ,    0.745 -0.412 0.058 0.0128 
 (1.230) (0.780) (0.053) (0.145) 
Choff ,    0.713 0.275 -0.168*** -0.869*** 
 (0.984) (1.003) (0.046) (0.127) 
Constant -0.545 -0.669 -0.027* 0.0745 
 (0.345) (0.837) (0.015) (0.0862) 
     
Obs 393 130 459 130 
R  0.144 0.423 0.383 0.638 
N 85 45 100 45 
Note: The table presents the results of two independent regression analysis where 
the first dependent variable is the change in credit risk of bank portfolio measured as 
a change in the risk-weighted assets relative to total assets (∆RWATA) and the send 
dependent variable is the change in non-performing asset ratio (∆NPATA). The 
independent variables are: (i) securitization ratio; (ii) size; (iii) loan ratio; (iv) 
equity-capital ratio; (v) ROA; and (vi) charge-off ratio (see Table 2 for deﬁnitions 
of the variables and the expected signs). Balance sheet measures used are lagged 
one year. The columns represent two sample periods of the regression models. 
Fixed-effects regressions are run for the full sample covering the period from (1) 
2001 to 2007; (2) 2001-2010 (not reported); and (3) 2008-2010. Year dummies are 
incorporated in all regressions (not reported). Robust standard errors reported in 
parentheses are corrected for clustering at bank level. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses: 
∗∗∗Signiﬁcance at 1% level. 
∗∗Signiﬁcance at 5% level. 
∗Signiﬁcance at 10% level. 
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Table 6 
RWATA (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
 2001 2008 2001 2008 2001 2008 2001 2008 2001 2008 2001 2008 2001 2008 
 2007 2010 2007 2010 2007 2010 2007 2010 2007 2010 2007 2010 2007 2010 
FamRL ,    0.00844** 0.154 
 (0.00405) (0.153) 
HEL ,    -0.397** -5.105** 
 (0.195) (2.448) 
CrCR ,    -0.110 2.389 
 (0.409) (1.895) 
AutoL ,    0.0841 -3.398 
 (0.213) (3.231) 
OtherCL ,    1.629** 3.432 
 (0.633) (5.795) 
C&I L ,    -0.0938 2.012 
 (0.358) (2.376) 
OtherL ,    0.0365 -1.760*** 
 (0.113) (0.578) 
Size ,    0.0415** 0.0762* 0.0400** 0.0660 0.0367* 0.0691 0.0352* 0.0673 0.0266 0.0662 0.0353* 0.0614 0.0354* 0.0964** 
 (0.0189) (0.0432) (0.0193) (0.0402) (0.0198) (0.0450) (0.0192) (0.0444) (0.0174) (0.0470) (0.0192) (0.0473) (0.0191) (0.0400) 
Loan ,    -0.249*** -1.094*** -0.246*** -1.108*** -0.256*** -1.101*** -0.253*** -1.108*** -0.262*** -1.100*** -0.252*** -1.100*** -0.253*** -1.084*** 
 (0.0625) (0.262) (0.0624) (0.264) (0.0618) (0.262) (0.0632) (0.266) (0.0650) (0.266) (0.0626) (0.266) (0.0628) (0.257) 
Cap
 ,   
 -0.716*** -0.0420 -0.721*** -0.0339 -0.679** -0.0365 -0.670** -0.0198 -0.709*** -0.0111 -0.670** -0.0604 -0.670** 0.110 
 (0.253) (0.810) (0.256) (0.794) (0.259) (0.809) (0.256) (0.799) (0.243) (0.821) (0.256) (0.798) (0.256) (0.786) 
ROA ,    0.740 -0.429 0.565 -0.538 0.708 -0.498 0.744 -0.841 1.587 -0.549 0.719 -0.460 0.737 -0.558 
 (1.235) (0.772) (1.260) (0.791) (1.208) (0.806) (1.240) (0.970) (1.438) (0.821) (1.264) (0.806) (1.246) (0.787) 
Choff ,    0.714 0.285 0.677 0.183 0.693 0.160 0.722 0.0788 1.144 0.186 0.728 0.108 0.724 0.210 
 (0.988) (1.008) (0.960) (0.971) (0.999) (1.020) (0.987) (1.013) (0.833) (1.004) (0.980) (1.012) (0.979) (1.020) 
Constant -0.543 -0.728 -0.512 -0.522 -0.452 -0.604 -0.432 -0.549 -0.285 -0.542 -0.434 -0.450 -0.435 -1.097 
 (0.335) (0.818) (0.337) (0.773) (0.345) (0.856) (0.337) (0.852) (0.309) (0.899) (0.337) (0.896) (0.336) (0.733) 
 
Obs 395 130 393 130 393 130 393 130 393 130 393 130 393 130 
R
  0.148 0.424 0.144 0.424 0.140 0.425 0.139 0.419 0.155 0.417 0.139 0.417 0.139 0.431 
N 85 45 85 45 85 45 85 45 85 45 85 45 85 45 
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Note: The table presents the results of regressions of bank credit risk taking (∆RWATA) on securitization activities broken down by the type of assets securitized. Columns 1–
14 represent seven speciﬁcations of the basic regression model using the following categories of securitized assets: (i) 1-4 Family Residential Loans ; (ii) home equity lines of 
credit; (iii) credit card receivables; (iv) auto loans; (v) other consumer loans; (vi) C&I, or commercial and industrial loans; and (vii) all other loans and leases. The sample covers 
periods from 2001 to 2007, from 2001 to 2010 (not reported), and from 2008 to 2010; year dummies are incorporated in all regressions (not reported). Robust standard errors 
reported in parentheses are corrected for clustering at the bank level. 
∗∗∗Signiﬁcance at 1% level. 
∗∗Signiﬁcance at 5% level. 
∗Signiﬁcance at 10% level. 
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Table 7 
NPATA (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
 2001 2008 2001 2008 2001 2008 2001 2008 2001 2008 2001 2008 2001 2008 
 2007 2010 2007 2010 2007 2010 2007 2010 2007 2010 2007 2010 2007 2010 
FamRL  ,    -0.00251*** -0.0140 
 (0.000602) (0.0141) 
HEL  ,    0.0796*** -0.365 
 (0.0279) (0.454) 
CrCR ,    -0.00436* -0.0619 
 (0.00258) (0.0990) 
AutoL  ,    -0.00870 -1.587*** 
 (0.0217) (0.409) 
OtherCL  ,    -0.0502 -0.586 
 (0.0334) (0.503) 
C&I L ,    0.0344** 0.323 
 (0.0172) (0.318) 
OtherL  ,    -0.00829 0.0621 
 (0.00744) (0.0528) 
Size  ,    0.00197** -0.00275 0.00253** -0.00202 0.00285* -0.00198 0.00307* -0.00189 0.00321* -0.00175 0.00314* -0.00287 0.00307* -0.00296 
 (0.000831) (0.00457) (0.00109) (0.00416) (0.00170) (0.00430) (0.00164) (0.00417) (0.00166) (0.00446) (0.00164) (0.00452) (0.00164) (0.00497) 
Loan ,    0.00510 -0.0231* 0.00857** -0.0239* 0.0104** -0.0228* 0.00947* -0.0289** 0.00990* -0.0223* 0.00943* -0.0236* 0.00950* -0.0234* 
 (0.00336) (0.0126) (0.00429) (0.0122) (0.00500) (0.0125) (0.00506) (0.0121) (0.00516) (0.0126) (0.00501) (0.0123) (0.00505) (0.0125) 
Cap
  ,   
 -0.0167** -0.0350 -0.0170** -0.0358 -0.0206* -0.0357 -0.0202* -0.0293 -0.0199* -0.0396 -0.0206* -0.0401 -0.0203* -0.0408 
 (0.00794) (0.0446) (0.00850) (0.0443) (0.0104) (0.0445) (0.0107) (0.0431) (0.0104) (0.0446) (0.0106) (0.0452) (0.0106) (0.0466) 
ROA ,    0.0529 0.0162 0.0832 0.0224 0.0728 0.0236 0.0634 -0.128 0.0449 0.0298 0.0704 0.0328 0.0644 0.0256 
 (0.0532) (0.145) (0.0503) (0.146) (0.0514) (0.146) (0.0496) (0.0939) (0.0580) (0.147) (0.0494) (0.149) (0.0497) (0.146) 
Choff ,    -0.177*** -0.868*** -0.176*** -0.857*** -0.161*** -0.857*** -0.175*** -0.900*** -0.179*** -0.860*** -0.177*** -0.868*** -0.177*** -0.859*** 
 (0.0478) (0.128) (0.0552) (0.131) (0.0488) (0.133) (0.0495) (0.128) (0.0475) (0.133) (0.0487) (0.133) (0.0497) (0.133) 
Constant -0.0340** 0.0777 -0.0471** 0.0647 -0.0530* 0.0634 -0.0564* 0.0660 -0.0588* 0.0596 -0.0577* 0.0794 -0.0565* 0.0812 
 (0.0153) (0.0878) (0.0207) (0.0795) (0.0317) (0.0823) (0.0310) (0.0788) (0.0313) (0.0850) (0.0309) (0.0858) (0.0310) (0.0948) 
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Obs 461 130 459 130 459 130 459 130 459 130 459 130 459 130 
R  0.378 0.638 0.348 0.636 0.310 0.635 0.308 0.665 0.311 0.636 0.312 0.636 0.308 0.635 
N 100 45 100 45 100 45 100 45 100 45 100 45 100 45 
Note: The table presents the results of regressions of bank credit risk taking (∆NPATA) on securitization activities broken down by the type of assets securitized. Columns 1–14 
represent seven speciﬁcations of the basic regression model using the following categories of securitized assets: (i) 1-4 Family Residential Loans ; (ii) home equity lines of credit; 
(iii) credit card receivables; (iv) auto loans; (v) other consumer loans; (vi) C&I, or commercial and industrial loans; and (vii) all other loans and leases.  The sample covers periods 
from 2001 to 2007, from 2001 to 2010 (not reported), and from 2008 to 2010; year dummies are incorporated in all regressions (not reported). Robust standard errors reported in 
parentheses are corrected for clustering at the bank level. 
∗∗∗Signiﬁcance at 1% level. 
∗∗Signiﬁcance at 5% level. 
∗Signiﬁcance at 10% level. 
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Table 8 
 ∆RRWATA ∆RNPATA 
 (1) (3) (4) (6) 
VARIABLES 2001-2007 2008-2010 2001-2007 2008-2010 
SEC ,    0.00603*** 0.0238 -0.002** 0.00632 
 (0.00215) (0.0295) (0.001) (0.00409) 
Size ,    -0.000986 0.00198 0.000* 0.00134*** 
 (0.00571) (0.00303) (0.000) (0.000485) 
Loan ,    -0.119** -0.0548* 0.002** 0.0185*** 
 (0.0469) (0.0322) (0.001) (0.00311) 
Cap
 ,   
 -0.507** 0.241* 0.001 -0.00453 
 (0.223) (0.141) (0.005) (0.0272) 
ROA ,    0.916 -0.778 0.060** -0.0703 
 (1.224) (0.571) (0.024) (0.0846) 
Choff ,    0.457 -0.842 -0.046** -0.345*** 
 (0.916) (0.665) (0.022) (0.114) 
Constant 0.111 -0.0413 -0.003 -0.0261** 
 (0.115) (0.0629) (0.002) (0.0105) 
     
Obs 393 130 459 130 
N 85 45 100 45 
Note: The table presents the results of two independent regression analysis where the 
first dependent variable is the change in credit risk of bank portfolio measured as a 
change in the risk-weighted assets relative to total assets (∆RWATA) and the send 
dependent variable is the change in non-performing asset ratio (∆NPATA) using 
random effects regression. The independent variables are: (i) securitization ratio; (ii) 
size; (iii) loan ratio; (iv) equity-capital ratio; (v) ROA; and (vi) charge-off ratio (see 
Table 2 for deﬁnitions of the variables and the expected signs). Balance sheet 
measures used are lagged one year. The columns represent two sample periods of the 
regression models. Fixed-effects regressions are run for the full sample covering the 
period from (1) 2001 to 2007; (2) 2001-2010 (not reported); and (3) 2008-2010. Year 
dummies are incorporated in all regressions (not reported). Robust standard errors 
reported in parentheses are corrected for clustering at bank level. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses: 
∗∗∗Signiﬁcance at 1% level. 
∗∗Signiﬁcance at 5% level. 
∗Signiﬁcance at 10% level. 
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Table 9 
RRWATA (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
 2001 2008 2001 2008 2001 2008 2001 2008 2001 2008 2001 2008 2001 2008 
 2007 2010 2007 2010 2007 2010 2007 2010 2007 2010 2007 2010 2007 2010 
FamRL ,    0.00568** 0.0230             
 (0.00257) (0.0308)             
HEL ,      -0.228 1.189**           
   (0.166) (0.513)           
CrCR ,        0.00649 0.0466         
     (0.0494) (0.0886)         
AutoL ,          0.273 -0.950       
       (0.202) (1.931)       
OtherCL ,            0.499* -1.253***     
         (0.298) (0.166)     
C&I L ,              -0.200 1.417***   
           (0.334) (0.523)   
OtherL ,                0.0377 0.0677 
             (0.0997) (0.156) 
Size ,    -0.000358 0.00222 -0.000804 0.00225 -0.00180 0.00285 -0.00188 0.00307 -0.00245 0.00381 -0.00156 0.00227 -0.00180 0.00249 
 (0.00590) (0.00299) (0.00577) (0.00284) (0.00572) (0.00289) (0.00573) (0.00303) (0.00552) (0.00286) (0.00570) (0.00287) (0.00577) (0.00358) 
Loan ,    -0.128*** -0.0543* -0.122*** -0.0461 -0.125*** -0.0503 -0.125*** -0.0498 -0.133*** -0.0439 -0.125*** -0.0431 -0.125*** -0.0528 
 (0.0475) (0.0321) (0.0470) (0.0310) (0.0466) (0.0318) (0.0467) (0.0323) (0.0482) (0.0308) (0.0466) (0.0314) (0.0468) (0.0345) 
Cap
 ,   
 -0.515** 0.233* -0.503** 0.311** -0.485** 0.233* -0.486** 0.225* -0.518** 0.209 -0.486** 0.317** -0.484** 0.231* 
 (0.222) (0.139) (0.222) (0.144) (0.224) (0.140) (0.223) (0.135) (0.214) (0.133) (0.221) (0.140) (0.222) (0.137) 
ROA ,    0.906 -0.770 0.862 -0.673 0.930 -0.774 0.938 -0.793 1.114 -0.784 0.901 -0.638 0.938 -0.767 
 (1.231) (0.573) (1.253) (0.606) (1.272) (0.582) (1.234) (0.621) (1.226) (0.561) (1.257) (0.624) (1.238) (0.577) 
Choff ,    0.466 -0.818 0.444 -0.629 0.456 -0.760 0.461 -0.705 0.522 -0.626 0.486 -0.596 0.476 -0.707 
 (0.911) (0.663) (0.903) (0.681) (0.973) (0.716) (0.914) (0.659) (0.913) (0.653) (0.910) (0.692) (0.907) (0.671) 
Constant 0.106 -0.0449 0 -0.0593 0.128 -0.0579 0 -0.0611 0.143 -0.0753 0.124 -0.0625 0.127 -0.0499 
 (0.118) (0.0625) (0) (0.0596) (0.116) (0.0612) (0) (0.0627) (0.112) (0.0595) (0.116) (0.0608) (0.117) (0.0748) 
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Obs 395 130 393 130 393 130 393 130 393 130 393 130 393 130 
N 85 45 85 45 85 45 85 45 85 45 85 45 85 45 
Note: The table presents the results of regressions of bank credit risk taking (∆RRWATA) using random effects regression on securitization activities broken down by the type of assets 
securitized. Columns 1–14 represent seven speciﬁcations of the basic regression model using the following categories of securitized assets: (i) 1-4 Family Residential Loans ; (ii) home equity 
lines of credit; (iii) credit card receivables; (iv) auto loans; (v) other consumer loans; (vi) C&I, or commercial and industrial loans; and (vii) all other loans and leases.  The sample covers periods 
from 2001 to 2007, from 2001 to 2010 (not reported), and from 2008 to 2010; year dummies are incorporated in all regressions (not reported). Robust standard errors reported in 
parentheses are corrected for clustering at the bank level. 
∗∗∗Signiﬁcance at 1% level. 
∗∗Signiﬁcance at 5% level. 
∗Signiﬁcance at 10% level. 
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Table 10 
RNPATA 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
 2001 2008 2001 2008 2001 2008 2001 2008 2001 2008 2001 2008 2001 2008 
 2007 2010 2007 2010 2007 2010 2007 2010 2007 2010 2007 2010 2007 2010 
FamRL ,    -0.00233*** 0.00648             
 (0.000771) (0.00462)             
HEL ,      -0.0278*** -0.0947           
   (0.00721) (0.0924)           
CrCR ,        0.00298*** 0.0194         
     (0.00109) (0.0210)         
AutoL ,          -0.00552 -1.486***       
       (0.0118) (0.503)       
OtherCL ,            0.00433 -0.105**     
         (0.00415) (0.0470)     
C&I L ,              0.0273** -0.182**   
           (0.0122) (0.0920)   
OtherL ,                -0.00299 0.0107 
             (0.00458) (0.0209) 
Size ,    0.000234** 0.00140*** 0.000132* 0.00164*** 0.000143* 0.00157*** 0.000110 0.00186*** 0.000110 0.00166*** 9.45e-05 0.00167*** 0.000120 0.00152*** 
 (0.000109) (0.000486) (8.00e-05) (0.000410) (7.56e-05) (0.000415) (7.31e-05) (0.000398) (7.28e-05) (0.000406) (6.89e-05) (0.000414) (7.44e-05) (0.000490) 
Loan ,    0.00210** 0.0186*** 0.00190* 0.0192*** 0.00259** 0.0198*** 0.00221* 0.0212*** 0.00221* 0.0201*** 0.00250** 0.0185*** 0.00223* 0.0192*** 
 (0.000849) (0.00314) (0.00101) (0.00315) (0.00130) (0.00309) (0.00122) (0.00328) (0.00122) (0.00321) (0.00126) (0.00321) (0.00123) (0.00334) 
Cap
 ,   
 -0.00119 -0.00648 -0.000559 -0.0147 -0.00386 -0.00597 -0.000923 -0.0122 -0.00128 -0.00966 0.000129 -0.0197 -0.000967 -0.00751 
 (0.00474) (0.0274) (0.00503) (0.0326) (0.00514) (0.0289) (0.00484) (0.0270) (0.00485) (0.0283) (0.00477) (0.0337) (0.00487) (0.0277) 
ROA ,    0.0400* -0.0686 0.0271 -0.0716 0.000757 -0.0719 0.0273 -0.121* 0.0265 -0.0671 0.0266 -0.0803 0.0273 -0.0664 
 (0.0212) (0.0844) (0.0265) (0.0890) (0.0348) (0.0829) (0.0310) (0.0667) (0.0304) (0.0875) (0.0300) (0.0904) (0.0308) (0.0868) 
Choff ,    -0.0719*** -0.340*** -0.0604*** -0.318*** -0.0946*** -0.331** -0.0591*** -0.297*** -0.0613*** -0.303** -0.0628*** -0.326*** -0.0604*** -0.310*** 
 (0.0162) (0.112) (0.0170) (0.114) (0.0233) (0.134) (0.0194) (0.115) (0.0184) (0.119) (0.0189) (0.114) (0.0195) (0.118) 
Constant -0.00280 -0.0269** -0.000863 -0.0304*** 0 -0.0305*** -0.000680 -0.0356*** 0 -0.0320*** 0 -0.0299*** 0 -0.0293*** 
 (0.00232) (0.0106) (0.00175) (0.00975) (0) (0.00971) (0.00168) (0.00882) (0) (0.00917) (0) (0.00973) (0) (0.0108) 
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Obs 461 130 459 130 459 130 459 130 459 130 459 130 459 130 
N 100 45 100 45 100 45 100 45 100 45 100 45 100 45 
Note: The table presents the results of regressions of bank credit risk taking (∆RNPATA) using random effects regression on securitization activities broken down by the type of assets securitized. Columns 1–14 represent 
seven speciﬁcations of the basic regression model using the following categories of securitized assets: (i) 1-4 Family Residential Loans; (ii) home equity lines of credit; (iii) credit card receivables; (iv) auto loans; (v) other 
consumer loans; (vi) C&I, or commercial and industrial loans; and (vii) all other loans and leases. The sample covers periods from 2001 to 2007, from 2001 to 2010 (not reported), and from 2008 to 2010; year dummies are 
incorporated in all regressions (not reported). Robust standard errors reported in parentheses are corrected for clustering at the bank level. 
∗∗∗Signiﬁcance at 1% level. 
∗∗Signiﬁcance at 5% level. 
∗Signiﬁcance at 10% level. 
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Table 11 
 ∆WRWATA ∆WNPATA 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES 2001-2007 2008-2010 2001-2007 2008-2010 
SEC ,    0.0700 0.0147 -0.003 0.00751 
 (0.105) (0.311) (0.004) (0.0266) 
Size ,    0.0318* 0.0724 0.002** -0.00235 
 (0.0183) (0.0507) (0.001) (0.00230) 
Loan ,    -0.267*** -1.046*** 0.002 -0.0203** 
 (0.0645) (0.228) (0.003) (0.00993) 
Cap
 ,   
 -1.031** -0.675 -0.023 -0.0592 
 (0.429) (0.794) (0.014) (0.0364) 
ROA ,    0.697 4.126 0.029 0.186 
 (1.061) (2.481) (0.048) (0.153) 
Choff ,    1.773** 4.412** -0.156*** -0.385*** 
 (0.855) (1.971) (0.048) (0.119) 
Constant -0.337 -0.681 -0.024* 0.0649 
 (0.314) (0.928) (0.013) (0.0456) 
     
Obs 393 130 459 130 
R  0.145 0.459 0.312 0.467 
N 85 45 100 45 
Note: The table presents the results using winsoried data of two independent 
regression analysis where the first dependent variable is the change in credit risk of 
bank portfolio measured as a change in the risk-weighted assets relative to total 
assets (∆WRWATA) and the send dependent variable is the change in non-
performing asset ratio (∆WNPATA). The independent variables are: (i) 
securitization ratio; (ii) size; (iii) loan ratio; (iv) equity-capital ratio; (v) ROA; and 
(vi) charge-off ratio (see Table 2 for deﬁnitions of the variables and the expected 
signs). Balance sheet measures used are lagged one year. The columns represent two 
sample periods of the regression models. Fixed-effects regressions are run for the 
full sample covering the period from (1) 2001 to 2007; (2) 2001-2010 (not 
reported); and (3) 2008-2010. Year dummies are incorporated in all regressions (not 
reported). Robust standard errors reported in parentheses are corrected for clustering 
at bank level. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses: 
∗∗∗Signiﬁcance at 1% level. 
∗∗Signiﬁcance at 5% level. 
∗Signiﬁcance at 10% level. 
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Table 12 
WRWATA (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
 2001 2008 2001 2008 2001 2008 2001 2008 2001 2008 2001 2008 2001 2008 
 2007 2010 2007 2010 2007 2010 2007 2010 2007 2010 2007 2010 2007 2010 
FamRL ,    0.145 0.0136 
 (0.125) (0.418) 
HEL ,    2.235 -28.85*** 
 (5.895) (8.775) 
CrCR ,    -3.449* 2.959 
 (2.012) (8.873) 
AutoL ,    3.575 1.530 
 (3.088) (8.578) 
OtherCL ,    1.538 -67.43 
 (9.396) (44.55) 
C&I L ,    -5.529 -59.94 
 (22.84) (37.47) 
OtherL ,    -0.456 0.124 
 (1.016) (7.602) 
Size ,    0.0335* 0.0723 0.0309* 0.1000* 0.0352* 0.0673 0.0299 0.0719 0.0315* 0.0872 0.0319* 0.0757 0.0315* 0.0726 
 (0.0176) (0.0510) (0.0183) (0.0536) (0.0187) (0.0639) (0.0185) (0.0510) (0.0182) (0.0531) (0.0184) (0.0515) (0.0185) (0.0587) 
Loan ,    -0.275*** -1.046*** -0.270*** -1.051*** -0.260*** -1.061*** -0.269*** -1.046*** -0.271*** -1.036*** -0.271*** -1.053*** -0.272*** -1.045*** 
 (0.0645) (0.228) (0.0639) (0.225) (0.0642) (0.250) (0.0637) (0.228) (0.0649) (0.224) (0.0651) (0.228) (0.0635) (0.237) 
Cap
 ,   
 -0.992** -0.677 -1.012** -0.525 -1.037** -0.688 -1.036** -0.677 -1.023** -0.605 -1.029** -0.665 -1.017** -0.676 
 (0.423) (0.784) (0.427) (0.726) (0.427) (0.783) (0.429) (0.783) (0.428) (0.774) (0.435) (0.784) (0.430) (0.784) 
ROA ,    0.727 4.123 0.755 4.019 0.557 4.070 0.648 4.143 0.647 4.021 0.603 4.168* 0.644 4.121 
 (1.085) (2.477) (1.064) (2.424) (1.018) (2.501) (1.078) (2.466) (1.070) (2.450) (1.080) (2.463) (1.071) (2.531) 
Choff ,    1.776** 4.410** 1.806** 4.251** 1.855** 4.378** 1.784** 4.423** 1.830** 4.290** 1.816** 4.320** 1.841** 4.423** 
 (0.853) (1.977) (0.857) (2.018) (0.844) (1.998) (0.841) (1.979) (0.853) (1.987) (0.845) (1.992) (0.862) (2.042) 
Constant -0.366 -0.678 -0.320 -1.175 -0.392 -0.582 -0.298 -0.672 -0.326 -0.948 -0.331 -0.733 -0.324 -0.685 
 (0.305) (0.929) (0.313) (0.956) (0.322) (1.196) (0.319) (0.930) (0.313) (0.952) (0.316) (0.936) (0.317) (1.100) 
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Obs 395 130 393 130 393 130 393 130 393 130 393 130 393 130 
R
 
 0.151 0.459 0.144 0.481 0.154 0.459 0.146 0.459 0.144 0.465 0.144 0.461 0.144 0.459 
N 85 45 85 45 85 45 85 45 85 45 85 45 85 45 
Note: The table presents the results using winsorized data of regressions of bank credit risk taking (∆RWATA) on securitization activities broken down by the type of assets 
securitized. Columns 1–14 represent seven speciﬁcations of the basic regression model using the following categories of securitized assets: (i) 1-4 Family Residential Loans ; 
(ii) home equity lines of credit; (iii) credit card receivables; (iv) auto loans; (v) other consumer loans; (vi) C&I, or commercial and industrial loans; and (vii) all other loans and 
leases. The sample covers periods from 2001 to 2007, from 2001 to 2010 (not reported), and from 2008 to 2010; year dummies are incorporated in all regressions (not 
reported). Robust standard errors reported in parentheses are corrected for clustering at the bank level. 
∗∗∗Signiﬁcance at 1% level. 
∗∗Signiﬁcance at 5% level. 
∗Signiﬁcance at 10% level. 
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Table 13 
WNPATA (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
 2001 2008 2001 2008 2001 2008 2001 2008 2001 2008 2001 2008 2001 2008 
 2007 2010 2007 2010 2007 2010 2007 2010 2007 2010 2007 2010 2007 2010 
FamRL ,    0.00768 -0.0140 
 (0.00593) (0.0141) 
HEL ,     0.0796*** -0.365 
  (0.0279) (0.454) 
CrCR ,     -0.00436* -0.0619 
  (0.00258) (0.0990) 
AutoL ,     -0.00870 -1.587*** 
  (0.0217) (0.409) 
OtherCL ,     -0.0502 -0.586 
  (0.0334) (0.503) 
C&I L ,     0.0344** 0.323 
  (0.0172) (0.318) 
OtherL ,     -0.00829 0.0621 
  (0.00744) (0.0528) 
Size ,    0.00151** -0.00275 0.00253** -0.00202 0.00285* -0.00198 0.00307* -0.00189 0.00321* -0.00175 0.00314* -0.00287 0.00307* -0.00296 
 (0.000714) (0.00457) (0.00109) (0.00416) (0.00170) (0.00430) (0.00164) (0.00417) (0.00166) (0.00446) (0.00164) (0.00452) (0.00164) (0.00497) 
Loan ,    0.00260 -0.0231* 0.00857** -0.0239* 0.0104** -0.0228* 0.00947* -0.0289** 0.00990* -0.0223* 0.00943* -0.0236* 0.00950* -0.0234* 
 (0.00282) (0.0126) (0.00429) (0.0122) (0.00500) (0.0125) (0.00506) (0.0121) (0.00516) (0.0126) (0.00501) (0.0123) (0.00505) (0.0125) 
Cap
 ,   
 -0.0209 -0.0350 -0.0170** -0.0358 -0.0206* -0.0357 -0.0202* -0.0293 -0.0199* -0.0396 -0.0206* -0.0401 -0.0203* -0.0408 
 (0.0135) (0.0446) (0.00850) (0.0443) (0.0104) (0.0445) (0.0107) (0.0431) (0.0104) (0.0446) (0.0106) (0.0452) (0.0106) (0.0466) 
ROA ,    0.0289 0.0162 0.0832 0.0224 0.0728 0.0236 0.0634 -0.128 0.0449 0.0298 0.0704 0.0328 0.0644 0.0256 
 (0.0482) (0.145) (0.0503) (0.146) (0.0514) (0.146) (0.0496) (0.0939) (0.0580) (0.147) (0.0494) (0.149) (0.0497) (0.146) 
Choff ,    -0.160*** -0.868*** -0.176*** -0.857*** -0.161*** -0.857*** -0.175*** -0.900*** -0.179*** -0.860*** -0.177*** -0.868*** -0.177*** -0.859*** 
 (0.0486) (0.128) (0.0552) (0.131) (0.0488) (0.133) (0.0495) (0.128) (0.0475) (0.133) (0.0487) (0.133) (0.0497) (0.133) 
Constant -0.0241* 0.0777 -0.0471** 0.0647 -0.0530* 0.0634 -0.0564* 0.0660 -0.0588* 0.0596 -0.0577* 0.0794 -0.0565* 0.0812 
 (0.0132) (0.0878) (0.0207) (0.0795) (0.0317) (0.0823) (0.0310) (0.0788) (0.0313) (0.0850) (0.0309) (0.0858) (0.0310) (0.0948) 
  
 47 / 48 
 
 
 
  
Obs 461 130 459 130 459 130 459 130 459 130 459 130 459 130 
R  0.316 0.638 0.348 0.636 0.310 0.635 0.308 0.665 0.311 0.636 0.312 0.636 0.308 0.635 
N 100 45 100 45 100 45 100 45 100 45 100 45 100 45 
Note: The table presents the results using winsorized data of regressions of bank credit risk taking (∆NPATA) on securitization activities broken down by the type of assets securitized. Columns 
1–14 represent seven speciﬁcations of the basic regression model using the following categories of securitized assets: (i) 1-4 Family Residential Loans ; (ii) home equity lines of credit; (iii) credit 
card receivables; (iv) auto loans; (v) other consumer loans; (vi) C&I, or commercial and industrial loans; and (vii) all other loans and leases. The sample covers periods from 2001 to 2007, 
from 2001 to 2010 (not reported), and from 2008 to 2010; year dummies are incorporated in all regressions (not reported). Robust standard errors reported in parentheses are corrected for 
clustering at the bank level. 
∗∗∗Signiﬁcance at 1% level. 
∗∗Signiﬁcance at 5% level. 
∗Signiﬁcance at 10% level. 
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Table 14 
Variable FRY-9C Data Item 
Balance sheet 
structure 
 
Total assets BHCK2170 
Size LN (BHCK2170) 
Loan BHCK 2122 / BHCK 2170 
Equity to capital 
ratio 
BHCK 3210 / BHCK 2170 
Loan portfolio 
composition 
 
1-4 Family 
residential loans 
ratio 
BHCKB705/ BHCKB 2170 
Home equity lines 
ratio 
BHCKB706/ BHCKB 2170 
Credit card 
receivables ratio 
BHCKB707/ BHCKB 2170 
Auto loans ratio BHCKB708/ BHCKB 2170 
Other consumer 
loans ratio 
BHCKB709/ BHCKB 2170 
Commercial and 
industrial loans 
BHCKB710/ BHCKB 2170 
All other loan and 
leases 
BHCKB711/ BHCKB 2170 
Securitization 
ratio 
(BHCKB 705+ BHCKB 706+ BHCKB 707+ BHCKB 708+ 
BHCKB 709+ BHCKB 710+ BHCKB 711)/ BHCKB 2170 
Risk 
characteristics 
 
NPATA ratio (BHCK5525+BHCK5526)/BHCK2170 
RWATA ratio BHCKA223/BHCK2170 
Charge-off ratio (BHCK4635−BHCK4605)BHCK3516 
Operating 
performance 
 
Return on assets BHCK4340/BHCK3368 
 
 
